Contrasting Opinions

Two distinguished historians and two contrasting opinions of a book. Just for fun, I’ve included each of their opinions below, and then I’ll give my evaluation of John Scott’s, Story Of The Thirty-Second Iowa Infantry Volunteers published in 1896.

Dr. James I. Robertson, Jr., from Civil War Books: A Critical Bibliography, Vol. 1:

“A poor effort toward a history; the author borrowed heavily from official sources and some letters published in newspapers; there is no evidence that Scott relied on any manuscript sources” (page 156).

Dr. Ludwell H. Johnson from Red River Campaign: Politics & Cotton in the Civil War:

“This was by far the most valuable regimental history used. Scott was more compiler than author, and he gathered some very informative eyewitness accounts of the campaign. The map of the field at Pleasant Hill was extremely helpful in reconstructing the battle. The book also contains much information on the battle itself, and on A. J. Smith’s proposal to arrest Banks” (page 298).

So which opinion do I agree with? The winner is Dr. Ludwell H. Johnson in this instance. Most of Dr. Robertson’s evaluations in Civil War Books are reasonable to me, but his evaluation of the Scott book is puzzling. Yes, Scott’s book does include excerpts from the Official Records as did many regimental histories written by veterans. However, Scott’s inclusion of eyewitnessaccounts of the regiment’s campaigns makes his book particularly valuable to historians. Altogether Scott devoted 158 pages of his 526-page book to coverage of the Red River campaign. This is appropriate since the 32^nd Iowa Infantry served actively in the campaign, and lost 86 men killed or mortally wounded at the battle of Pleasant Hill. Scott’s book is anything but “a poor effort toward a history.” 

Good Reads About The Red River Campaign

One-hundred and fifty years ago this month, the Red River Campaign started. The available literature on the campaign is surprisingly large, but there are three books that are particularly important in my opinion.

 

The granddaddy of the group is Ludwell H. Johnson’s Red River Campaign: Politics & Cotton in the Civil War. This was Dr. Johnson’s doctoral dissertation, and it was published in 1958. The book has stood the test of time because of the author’s research and his emphasis on military events as well as the political backdrop of the campaign. Another positive feature of the book is the author’s helpful annotated bibliography.

Dr. Gary Dillard Joiner’s One Damn Blunder From Beginning to End: The Red River Campaign of 1864 was published in 2003. Dr. Joiner incorporated traditional and more recent resources in his study, and there is a welcome emphasis on naval aspects of the campaign.

Dr. Joiner also was the general editor of Little to Eat And Thin Mud To Drink: Letters, Diaries, and Memoirs from the Red River Campaigns, 1863-1864 (2007). This is an interesting collection of civilian and soldier accounts of the campaign. Helpful appendices include a listing of naval vessels deployed during the campaign and a time line of the campaign. 

Cotton and a Disastrous Campaign

Not the type to mince words, Union Major General David Hunter assessed the aftermath of the Red River campaign in a telegram dated 2 May 1864 to Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant:

“GENERAL: You told me to write you fully with regard to affairs in this department. I may write too freely, but where great and vital interests are at stake you must excuse me if I am very free. Knowing that your time is very precious, I shall briefly state the conclusions to which I have arrived:

First. The Department of the Gulf is one great mass of corruption. Cotton and politics, instead of the war, appear to have engrossed the army. The vital interests of the contest are laid aside, and we are amused with sham State governments, which are a complete laughing-stock to the people, and the lives of our men are sacrificed to the interests of cotton speculators.

Second. The vicious trade regulations, or the vicious administration of them, have filled the enemy’s country with all kinds of goods except military supplies, and these they have been smart enough to capture. If this course is continued we cannot look for a speedy termination of the war.

Third. The best interests of the service require that General McPherson, or some other competent commander, should be sent immediately here. Port Hudson and Natchez are both threatened, and unless prompt action is immediately taken we shall lose the navigation of the Mississippi. General Banks has treated me with great politeness and kindness, and I regret greatly to say anything prejudicial to him as a soldier or a gentleman, but a strong sense of an important duty compels me to speak. The most intelligent of the officers of the army and navy will, I think, fully concur in all I have said. General Banks has not certainly the confidence of his army…” (Official Records, vol. 34, pt. 3, p. 390).

Several books have been written about the Red River campaign, but the one that does the best job of discussing how a military campaign evolved from a mix of political goals, economic concerns, and the desire to make a quick buck is Ludwell H. Johnson’s Red River Campaign: Politics & Cotton in the Civil War published in 1958. Johnson recounts how the desire and need for cotton fueled a campaign that ended in a Union disaster in the piney woods of northwestern Louisiana in the spring of 1864.

Next time: how the cotton trade led to a mutiny in the spring of 1864.