Cherokee Response

Reading both sides of a correspondence is important, and in that spirit this posting contains John Ross’ response to Governor Henry Rector. Ross’ letter is rather intriguing; on the one hand, he pledges loyalty to the United States but, yet, he does not entirely close off the possibility of some type of relationship with the slave States. Indeed, he attempted to maintain Cherokee neutrality, but that venture turned out to be short lived. The Cherokee Nation sided with the Confederacy in October 1861.

 “Tahlequah, Cherokee Nation, February 22, 1861.

 His Excellency Henry M. Rector, Governor of Arkansas:

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency’s communication of the 29th ultimo, per your aide-de-camp, Lieut. Col. J. J. Gaines.

            The Cherokees cannot but feel a deep regret and solicitude for the unhappy differences which at present disturb the peace and quietude of the several States, especially when it is understood that some of the slave States have already separated themselves and withdrawn from the Federal Government and that it is probable others will also pursue the same course.

            But may we not yet hope and trust in the dispensation of Divine power to overrule the discordant elements for good, and that, by the counsel of the wisdom, virtue, and patriotism of the land, measures may happily be adopted for the restoration of peace and harmony among the brotherhood of States within the Federal Union.

            The relations which the Cherokee people sustain toward their white brethren have been established by subsisting treaties with the United States Government, and by them they have placed themselves under ‘the protection of the United States and of no other sovereign whatever.’ They are bound to hold no treaty with any foreign power, or with any individual State, nor with citizens of any State. On the other hand, the faith of the United States is solemnly pledged to the Cherokee Nation for the protection of the right and title in the lands, conveyed to them by patent, within their territorial boundaries, as also for protection of all other of their national and individual rights and interests of person and property. Thus the Cherokee people are inviolably allied with their white brethren of the United States in war and friends in peace. Their institutions, locality, and natural sympathies are unequivocally with the slave-holding States. And the contiguity of our territory to your State, in connection with the daily, social, and commercial intercourse between our respective citizens, forbids the idea that they should ever be otherwise than steadfast friends.

            I am surprised to be informed by your Excellency that ‘it is well established that the Indian country west of Arkansas is looked to by the incoming administration of Mr. Lincoln as fruitful fields ripe for the harvest of abolitionism, free-soilers, and Northern mountebanks.’ As I am sure that the laborers will be greatly disappointed, if they shall expect in the Cherokee country ‘fruitful fields ripe for the harvest of abolitionism,’ &c., you may rest assured that the Cherokee people will never tolerate the propagation of any obnoxious fruit upon their soil.

            And in conclusion I have the honor to reciprocate the salutations of friendship.

            I am, sir, very respectfully, Your Excellency’s obedient servant,

JNO. ROSS,

Principal Chief Cherokee Nation.” (Official Records Of The Union And Confederate Armies, ser. I, vol. 13:491-492)

Arkansas Overture

The fate of the Indian tribes in the trans-Mississippi is one of the most tragic, yet one of the most relatively overlooked, features of the War. Early on, the federal government made a significant error by not actively reaching out to the Five Civilized Tribes (Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, Seminole) and other tribes (such as the Osage and Wichita) in the Indian Territory. This left an opening for secessionists to reach out to these tribes. Even before his State’s secession, Arkansas Governor Henry M. Rector penned the following letter to Cherokee Chief John Ross:

“…Little Rock January 29, 1861.

SIR: It may now be regarded as almost certain that the States having slave property within their borders will, in consequence of repeated Northern aggressions, separate themselves and withdraw from the Federal Government….

Your people, in their institutions, productions, latitude, and natural sympathies, are allied to the common brotherhood of the slaveholding States. Our people and yours are natural allies in war and friends in peace. Your country is salubrious and fertile, and possesses the highest capacity for future progress and development by the application of slave labor. Besides this, the contiguity of our territory with yours induces relations of so intimate a character as to preclude the idea of discordant or separate action.

It is well established that the Indian country west of Arkansas is looked to by the incoming administration of Mr. Lincoln as fruitful fields, ripe for the harvest of abolitionism, freesoilers, and Northern mountebanks.

We hope to find in your people friends willing to co-operate with the South in defense of her institutions, her honor, and her firesides, and with whom the slaveholding States are willing to share a common future, and to afford protection commensurate with your exposed condition and your subsisting monetary interests with the General Government.

As a direct means of expressing to you these sentiments, I have dispatched my aide-de-camp, Lieut. Col. J. J. Gaines, to confer with you confidentially upon these subjects, and to report to me any expressions of kindness and confidence that you may see proper to communicate to the governor of Arkansas, who is your friend and the friend of your people.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

Henry M. Rector, Governor of Arkansas” (Official Records Of The Union And Confederate Armies, ser. I, vol. 1:683-684)

A Skirmish With Important Results

I notice that sometimes scholars fall into the trap of the prodigious fallacy. Historian David Hackett Fischer wrote a wonderful book titled Historian’s Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1970) in which he documented with real-life examples dozens of fallacies from the pens of historians. As Fischer explained, the prodigious fallacy “…is the erroneous idea that a historian’s task is to describe portents and prodigies, and events marvelous, stupendous, fantastic, extraordinary, wonderful, superlative, astonishing, and monstrous—and further, that the more marvelous, stupendous, etc., an event is, the more historic and eventful it becomes. This absurd standard of significance is older than history itself” (70-71). Haven’t you noticed this fallacious standard applied in Civil War histories? Surely, the fact that an extraordinary number of casualties occurred at a battle means that the battle was extraordinarily significant! But, is that necessarily the case? I’m hoping that you’re thinking “No, that is not necessarily true.”

And so that leads us to the ranks of the 6^th Kansas Cavalry as they are about to attack an enemy camp on 3 July 1862. “We struck the enemy just at dawn—some of the brightest stars were still shining” (233) reported Wiley Britton in his Memoirs of the Rebellion on the Border: 1863. This surprise attack on Colonel J. J. Clarkson’s Missouri soldiers near Locust Grove (Indian Territory) resulted in the capture of 110 Missourians and perhaps as many as 100 Confederates killed and wounded. Union casualties totaled three killed and six wounded. So here we have it—a low number of casualties and a small number of people involved must mean that it was an event of little importance. Or, maybe one of those that was only important to those who fought there. That last one always gets me because it is so confining. It implies that combat occurs in a vacuum and has no possible effect on any people other than those directly involved in the combat. Relatives of those who fall as casualties are thus quickly dismissed as are civilians in the geographical vicinity of the combat. Guess none of those folks really count. But, I digress…

The Union victory at Locust Grove sent a wave of consternation through the Cherokee Nation. The Nation had officially allied with the Confederacy, but in actuality the Nation was severely divided in its loyalties. The loyalty of Colonel John Drew’s Mounted Rifles was so undermined after the Locust Grove skirmish that 600 of its men defected to the Union; it was the only time during the war that virtually an entire regiment shifted to the opposing side. The collateral damage from the skirmish continued. Union forces advanced and entered Tahlequah, the capital of the Cherokee Nation, and then continued a short distance to Park Hill where Chief John Ross resided. Ross had never been enthused about the alliance with the Confederacy, and Union troops arrested him and then paroled him. He and several family members ended up leaving the Nation—all escorted by a detachment of the 6^th Kansas Cavalry. Ross then went into virtual exile in Philadelphia. So, the moral of this little narrative: small military events do not necessarily lead to small outcomes.

For more information about the skirmish at Locust Grove and John Drew’s regiment see W. Craig Gaines’ interesting book, The Confederate Cherokees: John Drew’s Regiment of Mounted Rifles (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989).