Thursday, February 23, 2012

An Interview with Dr. Don Frazier


In September 2009, Dr. Donald S. Frazier participated in a question and answer session on this blog about his Fire in the Cane Field: The Federal Invasion of Louisiana and Texas, January 1861 – January 1863. Several months ago, State House Press published the next installment in this Louisiana Quadrille series. Recently, I purchased this book, Thunder Across the Swamp: The Fight for the Lower Mississippi, February 1863-May 1863 and found it to be a fascinating look at an oft overlooked campaign.

I contacted Dr. Frazier at McMurry University and asked him if he would be willing to participate in another question and answer session for the benefit of readers of The Trans-Mississippian. He readily and enthusiastically agreed. I always think it is fun to see what authors look like, and Don told me that this photograph of him was taken during a trip in Ireland. If you would like to purchase his book, you may order online from Amazon.com as well as from the Texas A&M University Press Consortium.

Johansson: In Thunder Across the Swamp: The Fight for the Lower Mississippi, February 1863-May 1863 you write “With control of the Mississippi’s west bank clearly a key to victory or failure for the Confederacy, much rested on the ability of Rebels in the Trans-Mississippi to defend their country and keep open these lines of supply” (p. 17). It is rare to see a historian write that the trans-Mississippi was the key to anything. Why was this Teche campaign significant?

Frazier: In days past, the historical narrative of the Civil War pretty much pointed to a Virginia-centric interpretation, and not without merit. Most writers dismissed the the Trans-Mississippi as insignificant to the overall story. Some talked about war material being shipped out of Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana in vague and general terms, but only recently have the resources been easy to come by to start quantifying the actual volume and specifics of how much was actually getting sent east, and how it was getting there. The old stories form a trail. I guess I have a unique vantage point in that I read and write about the Texas Frontier, and Texas history in general, so I am able to put the Lone Star State in a more strategic context as far as the Civil War in concerned. How can we expect a Civil War specialist from Ohio or Virginia to know enough about Texas to even make an educated guess? In the end, I suspect we all write what we know. For me, being able to connect the dots between Texas cattle drives and the Civil War has been a lot of fun.

All that to say this: Port Hudson is sustained by supplies coming from Texas. There is a telling photo taken at Port Hudson after the surrender that has more than 100 barrels of salt sitting at the landing on the Mississippi. At the time the post fell, the garrison had run out of beef to salt. They literally had more salt than beef or pork to process. That's why the Teche mattered. Nathaniel P. Banks--"Commissary Banks"--starved out Frank Gardner and his command by passing up the Teche, cutting the supply line of the Red River and the overland cattle trails, and wrecking Taylor's army. People often forget that the Mississippi has two shores.

I’ll provide an anecdote as illustration. At a recent meeting of the Baton Rouge Civil War Roundtable, I talked about Texas cattle drives that ended with intrepid 16-year-olds swimming thousands of animals across the Mississippi to feed the troops at Port Hudson. One of the attendees approached me after my presentation, and said, “My grandmother talked about how her granddad took the slaves to Texas to round up cattle, and brought them back on contract to feed the Confederate troops. I had never heard of that before, so I just chalked it up to her being confused about the details of the war! Then you brought it up here and it all made sense. When I’ve read about Port Hudson, I had never really thought about what they were eating! My grandmother had known all along.”

Johansson: Often, historians argue that the trans-Mississippi was a “backwash” for Union as well as Confederate leaders. Do you think that was the case during the Teche campaign?

Frazier: The Federals always understood that the Mississippi was the center of their efforts, not a boundary between two departments. The Trans-Mississippi, then, was part of a two-bank strategy, as opposed to the Confederates who used it as a divide between commands. As a result, you have John Pemberton failing to grasp the inter-relation between east and west banks, with fatal results. Meanwhile, the Confederate leadership west of the river fixated on retaking Arkansas and Missouri, at the expense of Louisiana. This dynamic speaks volumes about Confederate national priorities and their view of the overall situation. In the end, the “backwash school” of Trans-Mississippi Civil War history sells it a little short, and doesn’t think as globally about all the dynamics as it should. It featured pretty prominently early in the war, but it fades in the end. The end is what we remember.

We tend to fixate on number of troops involved and the dramatics of the military operations and equate size with importance. I wouldn’t necessarily discount that, but sometimes it leaves us a bit myopic. Had Pemberton and Gardner grasped it, like I believe Edmund Kirby Smith did, they might have been able to concentrate against Banks, parry that offensive, and perhaps even destroy his army. Or, had Gardner and Pemberton realized that they held the numbers advantage on the East Bank when the Federals barreled up the Teche, then they might have swept back into Baton Rouge and, as Captain Arthur Hyatt wrote in his diary, threaten New Orleans. Who knows how that might have reshaped things?

The Trans-Mississippi became a backwash, in the end, because a failure of Confederate strategic imagination caused it to become one.

Johansson: Nathaniel P. Banks and Richard Taylor would confront each other again most notably during the Red River Campaign. How do you think the Teche campaign influenced their assessment of each other and their armies?

Frazier: Banks believed he has decisively thrashed Taylor, and was looking toward “the next big thing.” Taylor had gotten that word, though, and was never one to miss a chance to throw a punch. In the end, Taylor’s resilience frustrated Banks and his ambitions to shine in other theaters of operations. He resented this, and figured the Red River Campaign would end this nuisance one and for all. In the end, it also caused him to get sloppy and finally lose his nerve, with disastrous results for Union efforts.

Johansson: The naval fighting and maneuvering during this campaign was fascinating. The campaign ended with the Union navy having an advantage. Why and how did they do so well?

Frazier: The Union navy was a professional force crewed by veteran sailors and experienced fishermen and merchant seaman. They also had plenty of material in terms of boats, weapons, and bold leadership. The Confederates has plenty of dash and pluck, but they had to make do with what they had. In the end, their lack of experience and materiel, the inefficiencies of volunteer crews and pilots, and tepid enthusiasm among steamboat skippers who were unwilling to risk life and property in defiance of the Federal Navy, gave the Union a decisive advantage. When the Southerners lost a boat, there wasn’t a replacement. Not so with their opponents.

Johansson: How did the lack of geographical knowledge hinder Union forces during the campaign?

Frazier: It often boiled down to making a right, instead of a left. I’ve done that with a GPS and iPhone all deployed. It’s these little things that often result in lost opportunities and additional casualties. The fog of war, and all that.

Had the Federals had a satellite view of the intricate web of bayous, roads, byways, and cut-offs, they might have been able to use their navy and army to maximum effect, and taken advantage of Confederate miscalculations. Instead, the terrain favored the Confederates, and provided them the cover they needed to fight another day. For the particulars, folks will have to read the book!

Johansson: There is an impression that there are few resources available for those who wish to study the trans-Mississippi. Did you find that to be true for this book? Which resources proved to be the most illuminating for this book?

Frazier: There were plenty of sources. I couldn’t use nearly all of them.

In general, I believe there are far more sources than people could ever need. The difference is that there aren’t as many bibliographies to mine! There are great regimental histories, huge repositories (LSU alone has about 4,200 collections that hold some relevance to studying the war in that state) and great photographs and images. However, who likes fighting an uphill battle? It’s much more fun to put in Gods and Generals and get into the cult of Stonewall than it is to do archival research and come up with an original thesis about a topic that is under represented in the current literature. Even in terms of tourism and cultural resource management, the Trans-Mississippi is terra incognita, so there are few parks and historical markers to even inspire the next generation.

Pioneering is never easy. Most researchers and writers want to start from someplace familiar. That rules out most of the Trans-Mississippi.

Scholars also must understand the interconnectedness of studies on, say, Reconstruction in Louisiana, the transition from slave to free labor, and politics in Louisiana and then lay on all the operational history we love to study, what emerges is original and important contributions to knowledge. That can also be said for Missouri, Arkansas, the I.T., and Texas, all fraught with potential. It requires researchers to have a degree of intellectual nimbleness than might not be as vital if they were making a rehash of some better known campaign east of the river.

Johansson: This is the second volume in a projected four volume set titled the Louisiana Quadrille. What will be the time periods covered by the next two volumes? When will the next volume be published?

Frazier: The next volume, Blood on the Bayou, will cover June 1863 through February 1864 and will deal with the fall of Port Hudson and Vicksburg, and its implications for operations in Louisiana west of the Mississippi. I am laboring away now, but give me a couple of years.

The last volume, Death at the Landing, will cover the Red River Campaign (perhaps my sortie into much covered territory) but hopefully I will bring to the task a more sophisticated context that previous studies since I will have spent so much time with the personalities, currents, and armies involved.

My goal: to inspire a fresh surge of investigation into the Trans-Mississippi. I do not believe that I have all the answers to what happened in Louisiana during the war; however, I DO hope to inspire a host of questions! My books, my work, are merely one take on the subject. With luck, others will build on these efforts and continue to roll back the edges of the unknown.

Monday, February 20, 2012

An Upcoming Interview



Next time on my blog: an interview with Dr. Donald S. Frazier about his latest book, Thunder Across the Swamp: The Fight for the Lower Mississippi, February 1863-May 1863.

Saturday, February 18, 2012

"Wounded For Life"

Blog reader Dan McCown sent me the following photograph from the Find a Grave website.


The marker is in the Bear Creek Tabernacle Cemetery about ten miles north of Avinger, Texas (Cass County). Dan was intrigued not only by the unusual inscription, “Wounded For Life” but also by the fact that the man was a Gettysburg veteran. I was intrigued too and did a bit of online research to find out more.

Black’s compiled service record was readily available on the Fold3 website, and it revealed a sad story. A 20-year-old farmer, John Adam Black enlisted in the 42nd Mississippi Infantry on May 14, 1862 in Grenada. His regiment saw no combat until some light skirmishing on June 30, 1863 near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. As a part of Brigadier General Joseph Davis’ brigade the regiment was heavily engaged on July 1st where they tangled with several enemy units (including the famed 6th Wisconsin Infantry) near the Railroad Cut. During the regiment's advance, Black's Company C as well as Company D served on the skirmish line. The regiment went on to participate in “Pickett’s Charge” and altogether suffered casualties of 75 killed and 190 wounded, a loss of 46.1%, at the battle of Gettysburg. Private Black received a gunshot wound to his right leg sometime during the fighting on July 1st. Records do not reveal when he was evacuated from the battlefield, but he was admitted to Chimborazo Hospital #5 on July 17th and sent to Howard’s Grove Hospital later in the year. His records then become a little unclear, at one point stating he was “furloughed” but also listing him as absent without leave. In either case, his records noted: “J A Black is disabled for life by gunshot wound received in battle of Gettysburg July 1, 1863.”



Black returned to Mississippi and married Mary Isabell sometime after the war. By 1880, they had moved to Cass County where John worked as a laborer. The couple had at least five children—three sons and two daughters. Interestingly, the 1880 census does not list John as crippled or maimed, and he never applied for a veteran’s pension from the state of Texas. A few months before his death, the 1900 census enumerator listed Black as a teamster.

His widow survived him by many years, finally passing away on January 7, 1944; interestingly her son, Walter Oscar Black, died on the same day. They were listed as living in the same household in 1930 with Walter Oscar listed as a farmer.

What exactly did “Wounded For Life” mean? Did he indeed have a long term physical disability as a result of his wound? Did he suffer from mental health issues? Or, did he make a remarkable recovery, and thus the phrase “Wounded For Life” became a type of inside joke? Whatever the meaning of the inscription, John Adam Black’s life was a remarkable odyssey from Mississippi to the Gettysburg battlefield and then to a farm in east Texas.

Monday, February 13, 2012

The 21st Illinois Infantry and Its Famous Colonel

Ulysses S. Grant’s Civil War career began in the trans-Mississippi, where he campaigned in Missouri for a few months. His first command was the 21st Illinois Infantry, a high spirited group nicknamed "Governor Yates's Hellions," because they "had mutinied over bad bread and had burned the guardhouse....the men robbed hen roosts for miles around and stayed out all night in the saloons of Mattoon" (p. 417), according to Bruce Catton in Captain Sam Grant. I wonder…did any of these soldiers detect any signs of greatness in their colonel? After serving in Missouri, Grant’s former regiment went on to compile a fine fighting record in Tennessee and Georgia. The short history below is from the “Three Hundred Fighting Regiments” chapter of William F. Fox’s Regimental Losses In The American Civil War, 1861-1865 (1898).

For more information about the regiment, see the following:

Illinois GenWeb: a roster and short histories of the unit are on this website

Civil War Flags of Illinois: three battle flags of the 21st are shown

“Cruft's Brigade — Stanley's Division--Fourth Corps.

1) Col. Ulysses S. Grant. W. P., R. A.; General, U. S. A.

3) Col. James E. Calloway.

2) Col. John W. Alexander (Killed).

4) Col. William H. Jamison.

Companies.

killed and died of wounds.

died of disease, accidents, in Prison, &c.

Total Enrollment.

Officers.

Men.

Total.

Officers.

Men.

Total.

Field and Staff

1

1

2

1

1

18

Company

A

1

14

15

10

10

146

B

11

11

1

14

15

146

C

1

8

9

8

8

132

D

1

11

12

24

24

142

E

11

11

10

10

139

F

15

15

17

17

146

G

1

10

11

18

18

140

H

16

16

20

20

157

I

18

18

7

7

138

K

1

9

10

12

12

148

Totals

6

124

130

2

140

142

1,452

Original enrollment, 923; killed, 113; percentage, 12.2

Total of killed and wounded, 374; died in Confederate prisons (previously included), 53.

Battles.

K. & M. W.

Battles.

K. & M. W.

Stone’s River, Tenn.

78

Kenesaw, Ga.

1

Chickamauga, Ga.

45

Atlanta, Ga.

1

Gay's Gap, Tenn.

1

Franklin, Tenn.

1

Iuka, Miss., August 21, 1862

1

Nashville, Tenn.

1

Chattahoochie, Ga.

1

Present, also, at Fredericktown; Siege of Corinth; Chaplin Hills; Knob Gap; Liberty Gap; peach Tree Creek; Jonesboro; Lovejoy's Station.

Notes.--A peculiar interest attaches itself to the Twenty-first, because it was Grant’s old regiment. The men in that command little thought that the stranger assigned to them as their colonel was destined to become the grandest figure in the war. The recruits rendezvoused at Mattoon, where they were mustered into the State service, May 15, 1861, by “Captain” Grant, and on the 24th of June, the regiment was mustered into the United States service by Captain Pitcher, U. S. A., with U. S. Grant as colonel. Grant continued in command of his regiment until the 7th of August, when he was promoted, and entered on the career which was to culminate in grandeur at Appomattox. The regiment served in Missouri until May, 1862, and then it joined Buell's Army. It was engaged at the battle of Perryville, Ky., but with only a slight loss in wounded. At Stone’s River, it participated in the hardest of the fighting, losing in that battle, and in the preliminary skirmish at Knob Gab, 57 killed, 187 wounded and 59 missing; total 303. The regiment was then in Carlin's (2d) Brigade, Davis's (1st) Division, McCook's Corps, and sustained the heaviest loss of any regiment on that field. Four color-bearers were shot down, but the colors were carried safely through the fight. At Chickamauga it lost 22 killed, 70 wounded, and 146 captured or missing; Colonel Alexander, an officer of rare merit, was killed there. After this battle the Twenty-first was assigned to Cruft's (1st) Brigade, Stanley's (1st) Division, Fourth Corps. The regiment reenlisted in March, 1864, upon which it returned to Illinois on a veteran furlough. It rejoined the Army while at the front, near Kenesaw Mountain, the men who did not reenlist having been attached during the meanwhile to the One Hundred and First Ohio. After participating in the Atlanta and Nashville campaigns of 1864, it accompanied its corps to Texas, where it was mustered out in December, 1865” (Fox, 358).

Thursday, February 9, 2012

The Agony of Marching

Captain John William De Forest could certainly turn a phrase, and he skillfully used his writing talent to document the activities of his regiment, the 12th Connecticut Infantry, in Louisiana and later in Virginia. In 1946, James H. Croushore edited De Forest’s journal and some of his postwar articles in A Volunteer’s Adventures: A Union Captain’s Record Of The Civil War. The following sample is taken from an article about the Louisiana Teche campaign that was first published in 1868:

“Oh, the horrors of marching on blistered feet! It is an incessant bastinado applied by one’s own self, from morning to night. I do not mean a single blister, as big as a pea, but a series of blisters, each as large as a dollar, or, to judge by one’s sensations, as large as a cartwheel. I have had them one under the other, on the heel, behind the heel, on the ball of the foot, on every toe, a network, a labyrinth, an archipelago of agony. Heat, hunger, thirst, and fatigue are nothing compared with this torment. When you stand, you seem to be on red-hot iron plates; when you walk, you make grimaces at every step. In the morning the whole regiment starts limping, and by noon the best soldiers become nearly mutinous with suffering. They snarl and swear at each other; they curse the general for ordering such marching; they curse the enemy for running away instead of fighting; they fling themselves down in the dust, refusing to move a step further. Fevered with fatigue and pain, they are actually not themselves. Meantime, the company officers, as sore-footed as anyone, must run about from straggler to straggler, coaxing, arguing, ordering, and, perhaps, using the flat of the sabre. Instead of marching in front of my company, I followed immediately in the rear, so that I could see and at once pounce upon everyone who fell out.

It was curious to note how cheerful everyone became if cannon in front told of the proximity of the enemy. We were ready to fight the bloodiest of combats rather than march a mile further. We filed into line of battle delighted, and then resumed our pursuit heartsick” (pp. 92-93).

Saturday, February 4, 2012

"I was once tender hearted..."


This photograph shows the position of Good’s Texas Battery on March 8, 1862. Although a peaceful scene today, it would have been a very hot spot indeed during the battle of Pea Ridge.

In an earlier posting, I documented the hard fight that an Iowa artillery battery endured during the battle. This time, I focus on the plight of Captain John J. Good’s Texas battery during the last day of the fight. Made up of men from Dallas as well as Smith County, John J. Good, an attorney from Dallas, commanded the battery during the unit’s baptism of fire. These battery boys first saw action near Leetown on March 7th, but would serve the next day near Elkhorn Tavern. Captain Good wrote about this latter action to his wife:

“…All were ordered around to Van Dorn. We reached the command in the evening. We had nothing to eat for two days before. We slept this night upon the ground with empty stomachs. Early next morning Van Dorn ordered my Battery to support his centre. We were no sooner in position than three batteries opened a perfect storm of round and

shrapnell shot and shell. We fought all for ¾ of an hour. Our shell and shrapnell having been expended and 25 men killed, wounded and missing, I ordered the Battery to retire. Hart’s Battery was ordered into my position and did not stay 10 minutes before they were litterally cut to pieces and retired. Just at this time to the astonishment of all the enemy made a bold dash at our centre, pierced it and Genl Van Dorn ordered a retreat….

The battle ground is strown with the dead, some killed by cannon balls, some with shell, some with rifle balls and some with bayonet thrusts. God forbid I shall ever again see such a sight….

I was once tender hearted, Sue, and expect to be so again when peace sheds her genial influence over the land, but on the field I had no more feeling for the dead Dutch than so many hogs. [I] did not budge from my course to avoid running over them. Confound them. I wish they were all dead and hope to have the pleasure of assisting soon in executions again….” From Fitzhugh, Lester Newton, ed. Cannon Smoke: the Letters of Captain John J. Good, Good-Douglas Texas Battery, CSA (Hillsboro, TX: Hill Junior College, 1971), pp. 165-166.

Private Sam Thompson wrote:

“…About 9 o’clock a.m. the Texas Battery and Churchill Clark’s Battery were ordered forward, and placed half mile to the front and southwest of Elkhorn Tavern, supported by a small battalion of Missouri infantry, about 100 strong. To the west across an open field were Curtis and Sigel. We opened fire with 6 guns and Capt. Clark opened 300 yards or more to our right. Very soon the Federal batteries replied from the edge of the woods beyond the field. A most terrific artillery duel followed. Capt. Clark was soon struck from his horse by a solid shot and after a short time the Missouri Battery made only a feeble response to the enemy’s guns, and all the Federal batteries turned their attention to the Texans, which was being splendidly served, every man being at his post giving the enemy the full capacity of our guns.

Here Charle Erwin fell dead at his gun. Billy Wilson had a leg swept off by a ball, and a number were wounded, besides a number of horses were killed or disabled….” From Lucia Rutherford Douglas, comp. and ed. Douglas’s Texas Battery, CSA (Tyler, TX: Smith County Historical Society, 1966), pp. 185-186.